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Abstract 
Embodied freedom 
In this article I explore the relationship between freedom and 
embodiment. Firstly I argue that freedom is an essential part of 
our being human, whatever science might say, and should be 
understood as the possibility to be ourselves. I propose an 
understanding that starts from the perspective of the second 
person. In the second part I analyse the writing of a scientific 
article as a case study of the experience of freedom in a con-
crete practice. I show how normative elements are a necessary 
part of such a practice. In the third part I argue that the “free 
agent” is in fact the concrete person who acts and thinks. I also 
discuss the place of causation. In the final part I elaborate on 
the view of the person, as understood from a second person 
perspective, and on the meaning of freedom, taking my starting 
point in the biblical understanding.  
Opsomming 
Vrijheid en lichamelijkheid 
In dit artikel onderzoek ik de relatie tussen vrijheid en lichame-
lijkheid. In de eerste plaats probeer ik te laten zien dat vrijheid 
essentieel tot ons menszijn behoort, wat er ook door de weten-
schap wordt beweerd, en moet worden opgevat als de mogelijk-
heid ons zelf te zijn. Ik stel voor vrijheid te verstaan vanuit het 
perspectief van de tweede persoon. In het tweede deel ana-
lyseer ik het schrijven van een wetenschappelijk artikel als een 
“case study” van de ervaring van vrijheid in een concrete prak-
tijk. Ik laat zien hoe normatieve elementen een noodzakelijk 
onderdeel vormen van zo’n praktijk. In het derde deel probeer ik 
te laten zien dat het de concrete persoon is die handelt en 
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denkt. Ik bespreek ook de plaats van causale relaties. In het 
laatste deel ga ik uitvoeriger in op de opvatting van “person” 
vanuit het perspectief van de tweede persoon en op de bete-
kenis van vrijheid, waarbij ik mijn uitgangspunt neem in het 
bijbelse verstaan. 
1. Introduction 
In her book Metaphor and its moorings M. Elaine Botha (2007) 
attempts to interpret the idea of embodied knowledge in terms of 
Dooyeweerdian philosophy. In this article, written to honour her, I 
will do more or less the same in relation to the idea of embodied 
freedom. This topic would actually also require a book rather than an 
article. It should be clear, therefore, that within the confines of this 
article I can give only the general outlines of a view that actually re-
quires a much more detailed elaboration and refinement both in 
terms of analysis and argument. I start with a first indication of what I 
understand by freedom and how it relates to our view of the human 
person. In the second part I offer a case study to elaborate on the 
situatedness and complexity of freedom. Next, I deal with some 
topics related to scientific discussions. Finally, I come back to the 
meaning of freedom for our life as humans. The last two parts dis-
cuss the embodied nature of freedom more explicitly.1 
2. Freedom as response 
In this part I will give a first indication of what I understand by free-
dom. I argue that freedom, contrary to what science may claim, can-
not be dismissed, because it is an essential part of our self-
understanding, and I try to show that the understanding of freedom 
exclusively in terms of free will or free choice does not do justice to 
our experience. I claim that freedom should be understood as the 
possibility to be ourselves. In the second section I add to the un-
derstanding of ourselves, in terms of a first and a third person per-
spective, the idea of the homo respondens and the priority of the 
perspective of the second person. 
2.1 Freedom as the possibility to be ourselves 
For many scientists the idea of freedom has become problematic. 
Especially the neurosciences have shown that behaviour which is 
alleged to be an expression of human freedom is deeply dependent 
                                      
1 I’d like to thank Gerben Groenewoud for improving my English. 
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upon physical processes in the brain. Some experiments, like those 
of Benjamin Libet and Grey Walter (Libet, 2004:54; Dennett, 1995: 
174; Den Boer, 2003:245, 247), even indicate that conscious 
awareness of decision making is preceded, however shortly, by 
activity in the brain. The situation in the social sciences may be 
different, yet, here too human behaviour often is explained in terms 
of cause and effect without any reference to freedom and re-
sponsibility. If, as a result, the discussion is about the degree to 
which nature or nurture determines human conduct, in either case, 
freedom is left out of the picture. Some scientists and philosophers 
draw the conclusion that freedom is an illusion. Others are more 
careful. Yet, it is clear that, however popular the notion of individual 
freedom may have become as the motivation behind many people’s 
actual behaviour, in the field of science and philosophy it raises 
serious questions. 
This apparent tension actually points to a more specific question, 
namely what the relationship is between theoretical or scientific 
explanation of human conduct and our concrete experience of the 
same. It will not be difficult to show that many examples of be-
haviour that are experienced as an expression of freedom are ac-
tually deeply influenced by genetic and social factors. For some phi-
losophers this is not a problem. “Compatibilism”, as the view which 
attempts to combine the notion of freedom with an explanation in 
terms of cause and effect is called, is rather popular among them. 
The problem of this approach is that freedom seems to be just a 
feeling and, therefore, could easily just be an illusion. At the same 
time, if some behaviour that is claimed to be a true expression of 
freedom is actually deeply influenced by social and genetic factors, 
there may be some truth to this conclusion. On the other hand, the 
main argument for the defence of freedom as not simply an illusion 
is our self-experience, both in an individual and in a social sense. As 
an individual I experience myself as a free agent, not just as an 
element in a chain of cause and effect. For our social life it is a basic 
assumption that people can be held responsible for what they are 
doing. This applies not only to our legal system, but also to family 
life, employment in a business or school, sports organisations, et 
cetera. In some sense it is essential to our actual self-understanding 
that we are free agents, that our conduct cannot be fully explained in 
terms of cause and effect, either of nature or nurture. I believe that 
this is indeed a valid argument. Whatever scientific explanation(s) 
can be given of our concrete behaviour, there remains a “rest” that 
escapes this explanation and which is essential to our being human. 
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Scientific explanations, both in terms of nature and nurture, are 
important for our understanding of human conduct, yet they are not 
exhaustive. Sometimes this is phrased in terms of the distinction be-
tween a third and a first person perspective. The third person per-
spective applies to science and its method of objectification. The first 
person perspective characterises our subjective experience. Tho-
mas Nagel (1986) has argued convincingly that the latter perspec-
tive cannot be reduced to the former. The strongest argument may 
be the fact of scientific explanations itself. Implicit in scientific ex-
planations is their claim to be meaningful and (potentially) true. As 
such they are part of the first person perspective. Therefore, scien-
tific explanations are human activities that cannot be fully explained 
in terms of cause and effect, in terms of nature or nurture. If this 
were the case, their claim of truth would lose its meaning. The third 
person perspective of scientific objectivity presupposes the first per-
son perspective of subjective experience. As a corollary we can say 
that scientific explanation itself somehow implies the validity of hu-
man freedom and responsibility. In part three and four I will elabo-
rate on this point. 
So the main argument for human freedom is indeed our self-ex-
perience. In this light it is remarkable that freedom is often especially 
connected with free will or free choice. Freedom is understood as 
the freedom to choose between alternatives (Nagel, 1986:116, 121; 
Labooy, 2007:146). I do not deny that this indeed is an essential ele-
ment of freedom. Yet, I wonder whether it is the very essence of our 
freedom as it characterises our being human. Is this actually the 
main point in our experience of freedom? Do I feel free, especially 
when I am in the position to choose between alternatives? It may 
even be the case that I feel forced to make a choice. Again, I do not 
deny that the possibility to make a choice is an essential part of 
freedom, yet, I will argue that our experience of freedom goes 
beyond the possibility of making choices. 
To get a first impression of this wider meaning of freedom, it may be 
helpful to refer to two distinct experiences, the first of which refers 
more to freedom in the classical Greek understanding and the se-
cond to the emphasis in modern thought. I can feel free when I am 
at home, because there I can be myself, I am accepted as I am, I do 
not have to prove myself, and I do not have to adjust to conditions 
that are alien to me, like a slave in a foreign country. Yet, being at 
home also implies that I accept the situation of “home” as given. 
Therefore, the experience of freedom can also be connected with 
leaving home and living on my own, creating a space for myself, 
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making my own home. The modern understanding of freedom is es-
pecially connected with making the world as we want it to be, whilst 
the traditional sense of freedom is more connected with feeling at 
home in the world as it is given. Although the emphasis of the 
traditional understanding is very different from the modern one, both 
kinds of experience, I believe, are universal. The point I want to 
make is that these observations suggest that freedom relates to the 
possibility to be ourselves. The first approach concerns our expe-
rience of freedom in a given situation, because it suits us as we are. 
The second approach relates to the experience of freedom in 
relation to what we would like to do. The two elements actually need 
each other, because of the beings we humans are. Freedom in the 
first sense I will call “receptive freedom”, freedom in the second 
sense will be referred to as “creative freedom”. Either way, the 
experience of freedom appears to be more than just having a free 
will or the freedom to make our own choices. 
2.2 Freedom and our understanding of the self 
“Freedom relates to the possibility to be ourselves.” This relation 
makes our understanding of freedom dependent on the way we un-
derstand ourselves. This dependence was already clear in the diffe-
rence in emphasis between classical Greek and modern thought. To 
give a few more illustrations, Immanuel Kant connects freedom with 
rationality, because, for him, inclinations and natural affections do 
not characterise our typical human nature, while the rational 
autonomy of our will does. Moreland and Rae (2000) relate freedom 
to a soul substance over against the material body, because for 
them the essence of our being human is to be found there. Nagel 
(1986) discusses freedom in terms of the tension between subjec-
tivity and objectivity, since, according to him, our humanness is 
characterised at the same time by its aiming at the objectivity of the 
third person perspective (the view from nowhere) and its being 
bound to the subjectivity of our first person perspective. 
In different ways Nagel as well as Moreland and Rae relate freedom 
to an absolute new beginning. For Nagel freedom in an ideal sense 
should be absolute, as if the choice between alternatives is made 
from nowhere. Of course, he realises that this is not possible. Choi-
ces are always made in concrete situations and are, therefore, con-
ditioned. No choice is completely free. Moreland and Rae (2000: 
125, 126) speak of an absolute source or an absolute originating 
source. They want to show the contrast between agent causation 
and event causation. The latter always functions within a chain of 
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events. The former starts something new and cannot be explained 
on the basis of what went before. The activities of human agents 
cannot be reduced to natural events within a chain of cause and 
effect. The distinction is important, but to characterise human free-
dom or even free will as an absolute (originating) source seems un-
warranted. It suggests that it comes from the “nowhere” that Nagel 
refers to, while every human choice is actually conditioned and 
situated. In what follows, I will propose another approach of freedom 
in terms of homo respondens, the human person as an answering 
being. 
Somehow Nagel as well as Moreland and Rae understand freedom 
in terms of the first and the third person perspective. Nagel argues 
that the free will cannot be fully understood because it finds its place 
in the tension between the two perspectives. It seems that we have 
more freedom if we can look at our situation from a greater distance. 
Yet, taking an objective stance also alienates us from the same 
concrete situation, and therefore becomes a hindrance to make a 
choice in that situation (Nagel, 1986:117). Moreland and Rae argue 
for the connection between free will and a soul substance. Most of 
the language they use can be understood from the first person per-
spective, as self-experience of being human provides the foundation 
for their view of the free agent. Yet, the very notion of substance as 
a characterisation of the human person betrays a third person 
perspective. The notion of “substance” is unmistakably a theoretical 
one, because it cannot be directly related to our self-experience. I do 
not experience myself as a soul substance. Besides, it contains a 
tension, because at the same time it is used to explain our unique 
individuality as a free agent and our essence as a human being 
which we share with all other humans. Over against Nagel and 
Moreland and Rae I propose that we start with the perspective of the 
second person. I am addressed before I answer. My being free is 
positioned in this answering. In sections 3.2 and 3.3 and in part 5 I 
will discuss the perspective of the second person more elaborately.  
3. A case study 
To gain some more understanding of freedom I will discuss one 
specific practice albeit only in general terms. Our experience of 
freedom is extremely diverse, so I have to make a choice. I made 
the contention above that science itself presupposes freedom. I will 
now attempt to substantiate that claim by taking for a case study the 
writing of a scientific article. One may even think of a paper which 
tries to argue that there is no free will, that the neurophysiologic 
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processes in our brain are all there is to determine what we do. First 
I will give a general description and analysis of the practice and what 
is presupposed in it.2 Then I elaborate on this analysis in terms of 
the perspective of the third, the first and the second person. In the 
third place I discuss how a worldview is involved. I end with a short 
conclusion. In my analysis the focus is on what I have called crea-
tive freedom. Yet receptive freedom is implied throughout. 
3.1 Description and analysis of a practice 
No one can write a scientific article without sufficient education, one 
which starts with learning a language at home and in primary school. 
It continues in secondary school and university. A specific field of 
study is chosen and academic abilities are developed. For the article 
itself research is done either by doing experiments or by reading the 
relevant literature, or by doing both. However, experimenting and 
reading are in itself not sufficient. The experiments and literature 
need to be analysed and conclusions must be drawn. In all these 
activities specific norms must be satisfied. Experiments and analysis 
need to be conducted properly. If they are done improperly, the 
result will not be acceptable. Next follows the phase of writing. New 
criteria apply, like consistency of argumentation and clarity of com-
position. In all these respects the author has to show competence 
and the result will be assessed according to criteria of excellence. 
Some criteria may be specific for the journal to which the article will 
be submitted, like the length of the article and the format and 
number of footnotes or endnotes. 
In this long process that preceded the writing of the specific article 
the author has probably experienced both freedom and the lack of it. 
Maybe at first he did not like to go to school at all and was forced to 
do so. However, at some point he should have enjoyed at least parts 
of his education. Either way, the possibilities he now has as a writer 
would not be there without this extended education. During the 
writing of the article, many choices have been made. Some may 
have been made unwillingly, like following the restraining conditions 
of the editor of the journal. Yet, even these conditions may ultimately 
have appeared to be a challenge that led to a result he is now really 
content with. “This is what I wanted to say. And I have said it in a 
way that completely satisfies me.” Such a statement, I contend, 
                                      
2 My analysis shows similarities to the description of a social practice by 
MacIntyre (1981:175) and to its reinterpretation as “normative practice” within 
reformational philosophy (Jochemsen, 2006). 
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gives expression to a true experience of freedom. Ultimately the au-
thor has expressed his ideas and perhaps even something of him-
self in a way that fully satisfies him. He appears to be himself in the 
work he has achieved. Of course, there may be limitations to his 
achievement, but it illustrates what I believe freedom is about. 
We will look at the above-described more abstractly now. I will make 
use of the theory of modal aspects of so-called reformational 
philosophy to do so. This theory contends that we can distinguish in 
reality about fifteen different basic aspects each with its own laws. 
The aspects can roughly be indicated as follows: numerical, spatial, 
movement, physical, biotic, psychic (referring to perception and the 
senses), logical, historical or formative, lingual, social, economic, ju-
ridical, aesthetic, ethical, faith or trust. The theory states that these 
aspects are irreducible to one another in terms of concepts and 
laws. This means that the theory defends both epistemological and 
ontological non-reductionism, assuming that laws refer to regula-
rities within reality itself. At the same time the theory accounts for 
the coherence between the aspects in terms of retrocipations and 
anticipations: elements within each aspect refer back to earlier ones 
and forward to later ones in the scheme. I will not try to show how in 
the case of writing a scientific article all aspects have a necessary 
function, although this would not be hard to do. I want to show, 
firstly, that different aspects have a different kind of function and yet 
are integrated in a specific kind of unity, even if the writing is de-
scribed as an event (third person perspective); secondly that the real 
unity of this event can only be understood in terms of an action of an 
agent (first person perspective); thirdly that both perspectives can be 
integrated in terms of an action by an agent called for and made 
possible by a specific situation (second person perspective). 
When we take the event of writing in a limited sense, it is clear that 
the body with its physical and biotic aspects is involved. This holds 
for the external bodily movements of handling a personal computer 
as much as for the internal processes that occur within the brain. 
Yet, to understand the nature of the event, these aspects are clearly 
not sufficient. In my earlier depiction it appeared that learning the 
proper language and methodology of the field of study were crucial 
for being able to write the article. In terms of the different aspects it 
is the logical and lingual aspects that indicate the typical nature of 
the event of writing and the article as its result. However, we need at 
least one more aspect to grasp the nature of the event, namely the 
formative. Writing the article requires creativity. It cannot be done by 
just following the rules of logic and language. At the same time this 
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creative freedom is bound to make a proper use of the rules of 
language and logic. The first group of aspects, like the physical and 
biotic – and I could add the psychic – form a necessary foundation 
for those aspects that characterise it in its typical nature. There is 
also a third group of aspects, which we could call the conditional, 
e.g. the economic, the juridical, and the ethical. Writing a scientific 
article requires that the necessary economic means are available. 
There is also the issue of copyrights that needs to be dealt with. 
Moreover, if the author is married and has children, it is clear that 
the way he/she spends his time will affect the other members of the 
family. There is also the ethical relation with colleagues in the field, 
and whether or not they are properly acknowledged for their con-
tributions. 
All these aspects are part of the event of writing a scientific article. 
Some of these aspects – most of them, as a matter of fact – have a 
normative dimension. Certain rules of logic and language, in general 
the accepted criteria of the field, need to be acknowledged. The 
economic, juridical, and ethical aspects also imply certain norms or 
values that should be respected. The physical, biotic and psychic 
aspects that in themselves may not have a normative dimension are 
integrated, though, in the event as a whole and as such can function 
in a proper or improper way. Writing with the hand or typing on a 
keyboard is not just a physical action; it is guided by the process of 
writing with its necessary rules of language and logic. The same 
should be acknowledged for the processes within the brain. They 
are not just physical movements. They are controlled by the event 
as a whole in its typical nature, just as the hardware of a computer in 
its actual functioning is ruled by the software that is applied for a 
specific purpose. What goes on within the brain is not an isolated 
process, it is integrated within the event of writing, within the overall 
life of the author and the long learning process that makes this 
writing possible. In the same way as the external conditions of the 
body may at some point make the act of writing impossible, it may 
happen with the internal processes of the brain. If the hardware of 
the computer is broken, the software cannot function anymore, and 
the use of the computer for writing is made impossible. However, 
that does not make the software explainable in terms of the hard-
ware, or even reducible to it. Let alone that the actual use of the 
computer for a specific purpose could be explained in terms of the 
hardware. The proper function of the hardware is a necessary con-
dition for any user to accomplish what he/she has in mind. It does 
not define the latter. The same is true for the neurophysiologic 
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processes within the brain in relation to the act of thinking. The 
former are a necessary condition, not a fully determining cause. 
3.2 Different perspectives 
Until now I have analysed the writing of an article in terms of the 
different aspects of an event. In other words, my analysis so far has 
taken on a third person perspective. I now want to move on to the 
first person perspective. Writing an article is not just an event, it is 
the action of an agent. A scientific article does not appear just 
because some physical or even lingual and logical processes are at 
work. The difference between an action and an event is that an 
action implies an actor or agent, while an event as such does not. 
Writing an article implies a writer. In my first description the author 
was implied all the time: someone was educated, someone was 
trained in a specific field and someone did the writing. Hence, the 
first person perspective was tacitly implied all along. It is the writer 
that applies the rules of language and logic. It is the writer that 
succeeds in being creative. It is the writer that moves his/her hands 
and body to hit the right keys on the keyboard to produce the text 
he/she has in mind. Even though the movement of the hands and 
fingers may be as automatical as the applying of the rules of logic 
and language, it is still the writer that experiences all of these as 
his/her activities. They are part of the action by which he/she wants 
to achieve the article. In all these he/she experiences the freedom to 
do what he/she wants to do or maybe also what he/she feels obliged 
to do. He/She may also have to overcome constraints. Maybe at the 
end the constraints are too strong. 
The processes within the brain are in a basic sense not very 
different. They too are part of the overall activity of the writer, even if 
he/she has no conscious control over these processes as such. 
He/She cannot change these processes in a direct sense as he/she 
can do with the movement of his/her hands. Yet, moving his/her 
hands is also the result of a long learning process. These move-
ments are not consciously chosen all the time. They are part of the 
overall free activity of writing which is chosen, this writing itself being 
part of a wider practice and of the life of the author. It is not an 
isolated action, but it is situated within a concrete practice. The 
actual functioning of the processes of the brain is part of the same 
overall activity and cannot be understood apart from it. They too 
have been shaped during the learning process of the author. They 
function within his/her life as a necessary condition, but not as a fully 
determining process. If the activity of writing the article is reduced to 
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the processes within the brain, it cannot be properly understood 
anymore. Not only are the aspects that characterise the writing of an 
article being ignored, like the logical, the lingual and the creative, 
each with its normative dimension, but writing an article with a claim 
of truth looses its meaning when there is no author who makes this 
claim. Processes, even in a logical-lingual sense, do not make a 
claim of truth. Here a first person perspective is necessary – the 
author with his/her aims and purposes within a concrete practice. 
This first person perspective cannot be analysed in the same way as 
the processes within the brain, it cannot be understood in terms of a 
logical analysis or an argument expressed in language either. These 
analyses refer to aspects of the concrete action of which the person 
is the agent. Within the action they are integrated into a unity. This 
unity itself cannot be understood apart from the agent that is 
performing the action.3  
To fully understand the writing of an article we cannot limit ourselves 
to the third person perspective. We also need the perspective of the 
first person, even where this perspective escapes scientific analysis. 
Yet, the third and first person perspectives together are still not 
sufficient. In this way the relational character of the activity is not 
accounted for. The first person perspective looks at the act of writing 
as an activity of the writer. It also considers the situation in which the 
writing takes place from the perspective of the author. As such it 
does show how this activity relates to the situation in which it is 
performed. We can also look at the act of writing from the 
perspective of the situation. This situation is not only a condition for 
the activity of the writing. In a way it also calls for the act of writing 
as a response to it. The author responds to the state of the research 
in the field and to the people that have written about the subject, 
whether they are explicitly mentioned or not. It may be that reading 
and analysing the relevant literature almost by itself led to a re-
search question that asked to be addressed. In this case the writing 
of the article clearly has the nature of a response called for by the 
situation. It may be that the topic was chosen out of a long cherished 
interest and that the literature was only collected afterwards. Even in 
this case the article will respond to the given situation. To be mea-
ningful the topic cannot be created arbitrarily by the author. He/She 
                                      
3 The necessary relationship between an action and an agent is recently explored 
anew within philosophy of language as speech-act theory (Austin, 1975; Searle, 
1969) which in turn has stimulated a new attention for the author of a text in 
hermeneutical theory (Wolterstorff, 1995; Vanhoozer, 1998). 
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responds to what there is, both in terms of the relevant literature and 
the people who have written about the topic.  
In a more abstract sense we can say that the author also responds, 
implicitly, to the norms of the various aspects that are involved, like 
the logical, the lingual, the economic and the ethical. Like the 
situation in which the writing is performed, these aspects too make 
the writing possible and ask for a response from the author. Both the 
situation and these aspects are given before the writing can take 
place. They are a condition for its possibility although they do not 
fully determine the act of writing. They ask for a response, the 
activity of the writing itself, in the same way as the rules of chess 
make playing a chess game possible, but are not themselves the 
playing of the game. For the latter a player is necessary, actually in 
most cases two. The author, like the chess player, responds to a si-
tuation and the rules that are implied when he/she writes the article. 
In a way we can integrate the first person perspective with the third 
person perspective from the second person perspective. The as-
pects, which we can analyse scientifically, are given like the rules 
that make the game possible. This we have called the third person 
perspective. The situation which calls for a response from the agent 
is also given. This we call the second person perspective. Then 
there is the agent him-/herself, who responds to the situation on the 
basis of the different aspects that make his/her response possible. 
The structures of the situation and of the response can, therefore, 
be called answering structures. They make the activity possible 
without fully determining it. In this way freedom is essential to any 
activity. It is made possible by a situation, it may be conditioned by it 
in many ways, but as an activity, it always contains the element of 
response. Without this element it would no longer be a human act. 
3.3 The ultimate horizon 
There is still another element in the second person perspective that 
needs to be mentioned. Maybe the writing of the article was not a 
free choice, but an assignment given by someone higher in the 
hierarchy. Even then there is an element of choice – the assignment 
is accepted or not. The author remains responsible, not just for the 
content, but also for the act of writing as such, even if the writing 
was an act of obedience. Being obedient does not take away our 
responsibility, although it does qualify it. As a responsible activity it 
cannot be totally without freedom. Obedience should never be totally 
blind. Obeying a command does not take away the responsibility for 
what we do. If the command is completely unacceptable we can 
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refuse to obey, whatever the consequences. I make this detour as a 
preparation for the final element in the second person perspective 
that I want to mention.  
The distinction that I just pointed out, concerns the difference be-
tween what could be called an answer to a question which as a 
challenge is implied within a situation, and an answer to a spoken 
call or promise that is addressed to us. Our response to a situation 
is not the same as our response to other people. This distinction 
becomes important when we look at the way we ultimately under-
stand ourselves and the world. So far I pointed out how we respond 
in a concrete situation in relation to its possibilities, its limitations and 
its challenges. However, each situation is part of the world at large. 
In our response within that concrete situation somehow we do 
respond to that world at large. This is true as much for the writing of 
a scientific article as for the political views we defend. We can 
always ask what our response means in relation to our humanness, 
the way we understand ourselves and our place in the world. It is 
part of our being human that implicitly or consciously we have a view 
about the reality in which we live. How did this reality originate?, 
Where does it go?, What is its ultimate meaning?, What is our place 
in the midst of it?, and What ultimately renders my activity of writing 
this article meaningful at all? As humans we cannot avoid these 
questions. If we do not consciously reflect on them an answer will 
show in our actual conduct, probably in line with what is common in 
the culture we are part of. 
The philosopher Martin Heidegger considered the question of the 
meaning of being the most basic that can be asked. Sometimes he 
characterised his philosophical journey simply as an attempt to ask 
this question in the right way. At the same time he rejected the 
answer of the Christian (and Jewish and Islamic) faith to this ques-
tion in terms of the world being God’s creation. According to him in 
this way an answer is given before the question is really asked 
(Heidegger, 1997:33). It is indeed a characteristic of the Christian 
(and Jewish and Islamic) faith that the ultimate horizon of our 
existence cannot be phrased in terms of a question to which we 
should find an answer; this ultimate horizon should rather be viewed 
in terms of a word that is addressed to us. For Heidegger the world 
at large is a given and as such it challenges us to ask the question 
about the meaning of being as if “being” is merely a “situation”. 
Christianity (together with Judaism and Islam) implies that as hu-
mans we respond to a Person who has revealed himself as the 
Creator in the world as his creation. The “Origin” of the world has 
Embodied freedom  
46   Koers 76(1) 2011:33-57 
even addressed us by revealing Himself in the words He has spoken 
by his messengers (Heb. 1:1) and as such is asking for a response. 
Actually, the very nature of created reality can be characterised as a 
response to God’s (creative) Word (Gen. 1). God calls into being 
and this call consists of two elements, namely a command to exist 
and a promise that it will be good (Geertsema, 2008:239). When we 
apply these two elements to our own being we can distinguish 
between two basic components in being human: calling and respon-
sibility in relation to the command, and desire and expectation in 
relation to the promise. These two elements characterise us as 
human beings. Being created can be characterised as answering to 
the promise-command to be, God’s creative Word. This we share 
with all other creatures. Here we find the deepest reason why the 
second person perspective has priority. Created reality is and pre-
cisely as such it is a response to God’s call to be. However, to be 
created human entails something special. As humans we are 
answering in our relation to God our Creator, answering through our 
very being, and answering in responsibility and expectation. In this 
relationship we are called to be ourselves. This call is a promise at 
the same time. In our response to this call we reach the deepest 
level of freedom. 
In connection with the concrete situation of writing an article, I made 
the distinction between the perspective of the third, the first and the 
second person. The second person perspective cannot be without 
that of the first. Being addressed and responding necessarily go 
together. I related the third person perspective to the scientific ana-
lysis of the diverse aspects of the situation in which we respond. 
Can we distinguish the same three perspectives within the rela-
tionship between us as creatures and the Creator? The second and 
the first person perspective are clearly there. As creatures we re-
spond to a promise-command to be. What about the third person 
perspective? Can we analyse aspects of this relationship in a 
theoretical or scientific way? It is clear that we can reflect on this re-
lationship. This is, however, not sufficient to speak of a third person 
perspective. Characteristic of a third person perspective is that we 
take some distance in our analysis. We abstract one aspect from a 
totality, but we also abstract from our personal involvement. Both 
are the result of what characterises the third person perspective: 
abstract conceptual and methodical analysis. It appears to be part of 
the relationship between creature and Creator that neither kind of 
abstraction is possible. The relationship between creature and Crea-
tor is all encompassing. So we cannot abstract it from something 
else. All analysis itself is possible only on the basis of this rela-
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tionship. So there is no possibility in any sense to take an objecti-
fying stance by means of concepts and method. At the same time, 
we are immediately involved in this relationship. Our very being is 
involved. So there is no possibility to take a distance from it in the 
sense of not being directly involved. For this reason, I believe, the 
relationship between creature and Creator escapes theoretical ana-
lysis. Ultimately our being as a response to the promise-command to 
be of the Creator remains a mystery. We are invited to live and 
experience this mystery. We can reflect upon it, but we cannot 
fathom it, let alone theoretically grasp it. Ultimately, the same must 
apply to the freedom involved in our responding both in terms of 
expectation and responsibility. We can reflect upon it, but we cannot 
fathom it, let alone theoretically grasp it. At the same time, being 
called to respond responsibly implies we can make the wrong 
choice. 
3.4 Summary and conclusion 
Let me try to summarise what my case study so far has achieved for 
our understanding of freedom, assuming that what I discussed in 
relation to one specific case applies in a general sense also to the 
myriad of other possible activities and practices in which we expe-
rience freedom or the lack of it. I started with freedom present within 
a specific practice as the response to a situation. Freedom is made 
possible by that situation and implies a response to it. Secondly, 
with the help of the theory of modal aspects I pointed to different 
elements that can be distinguished within this practice: freedom as 
connected with human creativity and freedom in dealing with the 
normative elements of the aspects that are necessarily part of the 
practice. Then I moved on to the perspective of the first person: the 
activity of the agent implies freedom. I made the contention that in 
this activity the different aspects are integrated not just into a unique 
event, but into a unique act of an agent. At this point the freedom 
that is involved already escapes scientific analysis, because it is part 
of the first person perspective and cannot be reduced to the third 
person perspective of scientific analysis. However, if the deepest le-
vel of our freedom and responsibility concerns the relationship 
between us as creatures to our Creator, there is a second and even 
stronger reason that human freedom cannot be fully theoretically 
analysed. Ultimately freedom is a mystery as our being human itself 
is a mystery. This does not mean we cannot reflect on it, let alone 
that it completely escapes our experience. It simply means that we 
cannot fully grasp it by means of theoretical concepts, let alone by 
the analysis of the special sciences. 
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4. Freedom and science 
4.1 The nature of the free agent 
In the beginning of this article I referred to the experiments by Libet 
and Walter. Both experiments seem to prove that there is brain 
activity related to a conscious decision before the decision itself is 
made as a conscious act. For some scientists this proves that the 
decision assumed to be an act of free choice is actually caused by 
processes within the brain. This, then, would show that free will is an 
illusion. Libet himself does not draw this conclusion. He assumes 
that the process of a decision is indeed prepared by the brain, but 
that our free will still has the possibility to give its consent or interrupt 
the process. Some critics have argued that the conclusiveness of 
both experiments is questionable, because they mistakenly assume 
that the decision of the will can be located in a specific place within 
the brain (Dennett, 1995:188). The point I want to make is of a 
different nature.  
It seems to me that in both experiments, as in many discussions 
about the freedom of the will, freedom is understood in terms of a 
decision made at a specific moment in time while the agent seems 
to be understood as placed somehow in a control tower where he 
makes his decision freely and then sends a message to the body or 
whatever part of it, to perform the action.4 I do not deny that in some 
cases we do indeed make decisions at a specific moment of time. I 
can now decide to raise my hand instead of continuing to type words 
on the keyboard of my computer. I have tried to show in the pre-
ceding sections that this is not typical for acts of freedom. The 
decision to raise my hand just for no reason other than showing that 
I have the possibility to do so is rather rare compared to my active 
life as a whole in which freedom is manifested.5 In most cases my 
free acts are part of a practice and are not isolated events as I tried 
to argue with my case study of writing a scientific article. Freedom is 
implied in the overall practice and in my overall conduct, not just 
located in specific, let alone isolated choices.  
                                      
4 The latter part is not even necessary if the distinction is made between material 
and formal freedom. The latter does not include the ability to carry out the 
decision (Labooy, 2007:146). 
5 Even as a supposedly arbitrary act it still has a specific context, because I want 
to show something. 
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Freedom as an essential characteristic of our being human cannot 
be reduced to decisions at specific moments of time. Just as 
important, it seems to me, is the fact that the “agent” cannot be lo-
cated in some special part of myself, like the mind or the soul as the 
essential substance of the person, let alone in the brain or a specific 
part of it. It is I, in the unity of my whole being, who is active as the 
free agent. It is also I, as the whole person, that is experiencing 
freedom, or the lack of it, both in being at home (receptive freedom) 
within and in responding (creative freedom) to a situation. I am not 
an “autonomous agent” like a decision maker in a control tower, 
separate from those parts of my body that are affected by my 
decisions. I am nothing without my body as I am nothing apart from 
my development within time and from the relations within which I 
exist. My freedom is intrinsically connected with the sensory-motor 
skills that I have acquired, with the education I have received, and 
with the many people that I have met and related to. Ultimately my 
freedom depends on the kind of creature that I am as a human 
being. However, this is not apart from but rather intrinsically 
connected with being embodied, with having a personal history, and 
with living in all kinds of relationships. In the concreteness of my 
being, I act as a free agent, experience freedom and the lack of it. 
We may study specific elements of these activities, isolate them 
from the overall practice of which they are a part. We can achieve 
fascinating knowledge about the way we function as humans in 
specific respects, for example how brain activities relate to specific 
experiences and how the latter can be influenced by the former. 
However, if we do not realise that, apart from the concrete practice 
with all its complexities, these isolated events loose their meaning 
and could not even occur; we misunderstand the nature of reality.  
What I have tried to show in my analysis of writing a scientific article 
is that freedom can only be understood as intrinsically connected 
with our being as a whole. We can analyse specific elements, but 
freedom in its full sense escapes our conceptual grasp. Freedom is 
actually as varied as human life itself. It is experienced by the pro-
fessional tennis player who does not consciously control his moves 
anymore, because his body and its parts move spontaneously to 
meet the challenges of the game. It is experienced by the piano 
soloist who plays the most difficult parts of Beethoven’s piano 
sonata number 29 in B flat major (opus 106 “Das Hammerklavier”) 
without any conscious decisions. In both cases the freedom to 
perform is based on a long training the result of which the body has 
“interiorised” and which gives the performer the freedom to be fully 
him-/herself when he/she in a way loses him-/herself in playing 
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either the tennis game or the piano piece. Of course, the absence of 
conscious decisions does not mean that the player is not fully 
concentrated. Loss of concentration would lead to an inferior result 
or even a complete failure.  
Another illustration of the experience of freedom would be a con-
centrated effort to solve a theoretical problem. Here, too, a long 
training has preceded. Certainly in this case the body is involved 
too. However, there is a difference. Both the tennis game and the 
musical performance are bodily activities. Physical descriptions 
could be given of the movements that produce the intended result, 
even if the achievement itself cannot be defined by physical laws. 
The rules of the game are characteristic for the achievement either 
in terms of tennis or music. In the case of solving a theoretical pro-
blem, the activity of thinking cannot be described anymore in 
physical terms. The activity of thinking is an inner act, certainly not 
without the function of physical processes within the brain, but not 
describable in those terms. The bodily functions are only a substrate 
to the real act. The brain processes are a necessary part of the 
activity of thought and they are guided by the rules of the thinking 
act, but the achievement of the thinking process is not the effect of 
processes within the brain. We do not think with our brains in the 
same way as we play tennis with our whole body and piano with our 
arms, hands and fingers. 
To summarise this section, what I have tried to show is that the 
freedom we experience in being a human agent is indeed embodied. 
The nature of this embodiment differs for different kinds of freedom 
according to the different abilities (and competencies) that we have, 
like thinking and playing tennis. In all cases it is important to realise 
that the body itself cannot be understood in a purely physical or 
biotic sense. Many kinds of abilities are interiorised within the body 
as the examples of the tennis player and the musician show. The 
physical and biotic aspects of our body are opened up by other 
aspects like the formative and the aesthetic.  
4.2 Causation 
This brings me to the other topic I want to discuss here. The issue of 
free will is often connected with the possibility of mental causation: 
the mind having a causal effect on the body, or in more technical 
terms, mental events having a causal effect on physical events 
(Murphy, 1998:132 ff.). I cannot discuss all the intricacies that are 
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implied here. The basic cause of the problem is either some kind of 
physicalism or its dualistic alternative.6 I will limit myself to three 
remarks in order to show that it is questionable whether the problem 
of mental causation is actually relevant to the possibility of freedom. 
• At several places I have stressed the unity of the activity as a 
whole, even where different aspects and elements can be 
distinguished. All human activities in principle function in all the 
aspects that I mentioned earlier in relation to the theory of modal 
aspects of reformational philosophy. However, these aspects are 
not the original elements, let alone events, that only later are 
combined together in a concrete act. If we analyse these aspects 
this is only possible by abstracting them from the concrete activity 
to which they belong. They are not separate physical and mental 
events that need to be integrated by a causal relation. They 
certainly are integrated, but this is because they are aspects of 
one and the same typical activity, not because of a cause and 
effect relationship between them. The agent is not a mental event 
or a soul substance, the agent is the concrete person that 
performs a concrete action. Therefore, as far as a concrete 
activity is concerned, it is of no use to speak of mental causation 
as if the mental aspect would have a causal influence on the 
physical aspect. It is of no use to speak of physical causation in 
this respect either. Both the “mental event” and the “physical 
event” are an abstraction from the integrated unity of the concrete 
act by a concrete agent.7  
• To understand the nature of a causal relationship it is important to 
distinguish between a causal relationship in the sense of one 
event causing a change in another event, and a causal relation-
ship in the sense of one event being the cause of the other event 
in a total sense. In other words, we should distinguish between a 
physical thing or event causing a change in, e.g. a biotic 
organism, and a physical thing or event being the cause through 
which the biotic organism comes into being. Physicalism in one 
way or another assumes the latter. In this way, however, some 
                                      
6 For a critical discussion of physicalism, see Geertsema (2000; 2006). 
7 For the understanding of the integration of different aspects within one 
phenomenon Dooyeweerd’s theory of structures of individuality is important. A 
more complex analysis can be made in terms of an “enkaptic structural whole” 
which integrates or encapsulates different individuality structures into the unity 
of one thing. For both, see Dooyeweerd (1957). 
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kind of reductionism is unavoidable. What we actually can ob-
serve are cases of the first kind of causality. This is true for our 
common sense experience as well as for specialised research in 
the field of the neurosciences, and at least for our common sense 
experience it works both ways. Physical phenomena can affect 
my thinking and my thinking can affect physical phenomena. As 
far as I know there is no proof, not even any empirical evidence, 
that the second kind of causal relationship exists. What we 
observe is that there are correlations between the physical aspect 
on the one hand and the emotional, logical and other aspects of 
specific “mental” phenomena on the other hand. This is, however, 
no proof that there is a causal relationship between them. It just 
shows that within a concrete event or experience the different 
aspects form a unity and (maybe) that one aspect of it cannot be 
changed without an effect for the event or experience as a whole, 
including the other aspects.  
• We should not confuse the relationship between different aspects 
of one and the same concrete phenomenon (thing, activity or 
event) and the relationship between different concrete pheno-
mena. The theoretical explanation for the possibility that pheno-
mena of one kind can have a causal effect on phenomena of 
another kind is hardly possible when these different phenomena 
have nothing in common, like the isolated physical and mental 
events that are often assumed. This is true as much for the 
“physical event” having a causal effect on the “mental event” as 
the other way around. When we accept the theory of individual 
things of reformational philosophy the situation changes drama-
tically. Essential for this theory is that all things, events, activities, 
function, at least potentially, in all aspects, only what charac-
terises them is different. It is these concrete phenomena that 
have a possible causal effect on other concrete phenomena, 
even if they are of a different kind. Because they function in prin-
ciple in all the aspects they are not completely different. 
Functioning within the same aspects, but with a different aspec-
tual qualification, there are all kinds of coherences between them 
which make the causal relationships possible. We need to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the way the different as-
pects of a concrete phenomenon are integrated into a whole, and 
on the other hand, the relationship between different phenomena. 
The latter may be of a causal nature, the first is not. Whether 
these different phenomena are both internal to the body or one of 
them external, effecting a bodily process from outside, is not 
important. My digestive system is also distinct from my thinking. 
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The one can affect the other directly or indirectly, but this does 
not mean that the organic aspect has a causal effect on the 
logical aspect or the other way around. The causal relationship is 
between one concrete system and another concrete system, both 
systems, although of a different kind, having in principle all the 
different aspects (Geertsema, 2002). 
5. Freedom and human fulfilment 
5.1 Responsibility and expectation 
In part four above, I elaborated on the relationship between the un-
derstanding of freedom and scientific analysis, which I discussed in 
part three. Now I will look in the other direction, that of worldview or 
religion. In my first reflection on freedom as response, I contended 
that our understanding of freedom depends on the way we under-
stand ourselves. Towards the end of the case study I pointed to the 
biblical understanding of the world as God’s creation and intro-
duced the idea of the human person as answering the promise-
command to be both in terms of longing and expectation and of 
calling and responsibility. It is this point I now want to elaborate on. 
To be human means to respond to God’s promise-command to be. 
This applies to both the unity and the diversity of our being. In all 
aspects of our lives we can discern an element of longing and ex-
pectation and of calling and responsibility. These two elements are 
actually interconnected. On the one hand, our longings and expecta-
tions are not just givens. We are responsible for the way we deal 
with them. Even if we recognise that they are shaped by the 
direction we have taken in life, by the understanding we have gained 
of what it means to be human, by the stimuli and incentives that we 
receive, both from inside and outside, we cannot just take them for 
granted as we experience them in ourselves and around us. 
However much they are part of our being human, we have to take 
responsibility for our longings and expectations, to some extent as to 
how they have become part of ourselves, but especially as to how 
we respond to them in the present situation. On the other hand, to 
be called and to be held responsible, is in itself closely tied with our 
longings and expectations. It is essential for being human that we 
are taken seriously, that we are respected and acknowledged for 
who we are. This implies that we are recognised as capable of car-
rying out responsible tasks. Of course, sometimes we rather avoid 
certain responsibilities or try to escape from being held responsible. 
In a deep sense, however, to be denied any responsibility would 
mean not to be acknowledged as being fully human. To be called 
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upon and being responsible is a deep-seated longing and expecta-
tion in our being human.  
The second point I want to emphasise is the great diversity both in 
terms of calling and responsibility and of longing and expectation. In 
principle these two elements apply to all aspects of our lives. We 
look for fulfilment in pursuing a career in art, in politics, in business, 
in sports, in science, et cetera. We look for fulfilment in human rela-
tions of marriage, family and friendship. In each case true fulfilment 
can only occur when the two sides of calling and responsibility and 
of longing and expectation go together. For a human life in freedom 
it is not sufficient that our longings and expectations are fulfilled 
while our calling and responsibility are ignored. If this were the case, 
my freedom would easily place me over against the freedom of the 
other. It is the freedom that creates its own home in isolation, at the 
expense of others. It would amount to the absolutisation of what I 
called earlier “creative freedom”. It misses the experience of free-
dom as being at home in open relationships with others (receptive 
freedom), human freedom that requires the recognition of the other 
for who he/she is. At the same time, if our calling and responsibility 
is experienced apart from a recognition of our own longings and 
expectations, there will be no true fulfilment either. We ourselves 
need to be recognised too, not just the needs of the other. Again, 
this applies to all aspects of our life. The freedom we can experience 
in any area depends on being fulfilled as human both in terms of 
longing and expectation and of calling and responsibility. 
5.2 Frustration and salvation 
The picture of freedom I have sketched so far may seem rather 
idealistic.  It is indeed far from a description of actual reality as if the 
factual world shows both calling and responsibility and longings and 
expectations to function in complete harmony. I do, however, claim 
that the picture I have drawn is true to reality both in the sense that it 
shows how it could or should be and that it can make us sensitive 
for what is wrong. Our actual world, according to the biblical picture, 
is indeed not how it is intended to be. This applies even more to us 
as humans. Brokenness shows up in all aspects of human life, in all 
relationships, in our physical and social being, again both in terms of 
longing and expectation and of calling and responsibility. This 
brokenness becomes even clearer when we take into account the 
basic relationship between us as creatures and the Creator. Jesus 
summarises the intended nature of this relationship with the summa-
ry of the law of God in the great commandment, namely to love God 
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above all and our neighbours as ourselves (Matt. 22). If we take this 
commandment also to imply a promise, it relates not only to calling 
and responsibility, but also to longing and expectation. It indicates 
the ultimate fulfilment of our being human in both respects. Our 
actual situation shows how far we are alienated from this fulfilment. 
Freedom as the possibility to be ourselves as we are meant to be is 
deeply frustrated. Paul speaks of our being enslaved to sin (Rom. 6) 
and separated from the life of God (Eph. 4). The biblical picture fully 
accounts for both the freedom we are intended to experience in our 
relationship with God and our fellow creatures and how deeply we 
are fallen away from this destination. Again, both are manifest in all 
aspects of our life, including the physical. However, the biblical 
message also points to the way towards liberation. Central to Paul’s 
teaching is that those who believe are free in Christ (Galatians). This 
new freedom first concerns the new relationship with God, but then it 
implies the full restoration (and even more) of our original place 
within the creation (Rom. 8; 1 Cor. 15; Rev. 21 and 22; cf. Gen. 1 
and 2).  
Both within the teaching of Paul and in the wider experience of 
humankind, we can find the possibility of an inner freedom in the 
midst of all kinds of brokenness. For Paul it is the relationship with 
Christ that makes it possible not to be disturbed anymore by 
external circumstances (Phil. 4). The Stoa also taught a way through 
which the inner man would not be troubled by the external 
conditions of life. Plato even saw the body and its connection with 
material life as a prison for the soul. There is indeed the possibility of 
an inner freedom that makes us less vulnerable to outward condi-
tions. However, this inner freedom ought not to make us less sensi-
tive to the suffering of others. In this sense the New Testament does 
not teach any kind of “apatheia” like the Stoa. Yet, it is crucial for the 
biblical teaching that freedom in its fullness cannot be limited to an 
inner experience, even when this is based in the relationship with 
Christ. The promise of liberation also concerns our bodily existence 
in its full sense as the hope of the resurrection makes clear. Ac-
cording to the New Testament, the freedom that will be experienced 
in the new life in the new creation in which heaven and earth are 
united, will be fully embodied, even in a way we cannot imagine 
today, as our body too will be transformed (1 Cor. 15; Wright, 2007). 
We may receive a glimpse of this new embodied freedom when we 
read the stories about the risen Christ at the end of the Gospels, 
especially those of Luke and John. 
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